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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EMINENT DOMAIN LAW IN HUNGARY 
By 
Csaba János Gáli 
 
 
 
Taking private property by the government is a long tradition in market economies. 
Economic theories have been developed to support the case law and the legislation with efficient 
rules on the conditions and the compensations. Private property rights have been protected in 
Hungary since 1989, while the latest regulation on eminent domain has been in effect for less 
than four years. This paper examines the efficiency of the current regulation structure to see if 
the side effects of such a powerful tool distort the market economy. The analysis of the current 
regulation is based on the microeconomic incentives theory. It concludes that the regulation on 
different takings is not well structured and the property rights should be protected equally. The 
condition system of exercising the eminent domain power is lacking the most important 
economic justification, the holdout problem. Amending the rules is important to avoid harmful 
takings and inefficient substitutions. The compensation regulations are reasonable, but unable to 
mitigate the risk of takings driven by wealth transfers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Private property is probably the most important foundation of a market economy. It is the 
precondition of trade and all of its consequences, such as the benefits of comparative advantages. The 
protection of private property is necessary for voluntary market transactions that maximize the value 
of the resources by allocating them efficiently to those who value them the most. This protection 
however, directly implies the existence of involuntary transactions. Without mandatory taxes, it is 
impossible to finance a judicial system to protect property rights. Microeconomic theory suggests 
that involuntary transactions have negative, distorting effects on the market causing the deadweight 
loss. Economists and policymakers want to reduce such effects, especially by spreading the risk 
among taxpayers or using a broad base for taxes or other restrictions. 
Taxation is not the only justification for governments to deprive property rights. 
Government interference can also mitigate the negative consequences of some market failures. 
“The eminent domain is the strongest instrument of the government to interfere with property 
rights”, declares the Constitutional Court of Hungary in its most important decision on the law of 
eminent domain [35/2005. (IX. 29.) ABH1]. This power authorizes the government to bypass the 
market mechanism with an involuntary transaction of property rights, typically to take the 
ownership of a piece of land. 
There are many reasons for not selling a property, and so there are many justifications for 
takings as well; economic reasoning is just one of them. But without an economic justification, 
the negative consequences of bypassing the market can overwhelm the expected gains, thus 
takings can actually decrease the social wealth. The different conditions of the takings, the 
procedural costs, as well as the existence and the amount of compensation all matter to determine 
                                                             
1 The abbreviation stands for the decision of the Constitutional Court. 
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whether the government’s eminent domain power is beneficial or harmful for a society. The net 
result depends on the details of a country’s regulation. A good regulatory system can make 
eminent domain a valuable mean for increasing social efficiency; while a poorly designed one 
can cause owners to reduce their investments, others to initiate takings for pure wealth transfers 
and the government to take instead of buying.  
The Hungarian regulation is worth analyzing for two main reasons. First, the recently 
adopted Expropriation Act has not been discussed on efficiency basis. Second, there is no 
economic justification behind the Act, the practice of the Constitutional Court or the regular 
courts’ case law. Without the practicioners’ deep understanding of the economic reasons behind 
the power of takings, the effect of the text of the law gains utmost importance. This thesis does 
not seek to place an ultimate judgment on the question of whether the Hungarian regulatory 
system is generally good or bad. Instead, it will try to find the points where the regulation is 
improvable, where the incentives created have a negative effect on social efficiency and thus 
support the improvement. 
Having identified the possible drawbacks to the Hungarian eminent domain power, this thesis 
aims to have an impact on the formation of this legal institution. The underlying cause of these 
problems is that the incentives are different from those under the market conditions. The people 
concerned act upon the non-natural incentives, trying to maximize their utility under the given 
conditions. It is possible to improve the efficiency of the incentive structure, by changing one or 
more aspects of the regulation, therefore this study will come up with recommendations. 
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METHODOLOGY 
TERMINOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES 
The takings clause of the U.S. Constitution and the framework of the common law give 
an ambiguous meaning for the eminent domain concept. In each case, the ruling court decides 
whether the clause is applicable or not. Based on the different decisions, the economic theories 
could not give a generally undisputed, descriptive definition of eminent domain. They qualify the 
different restrictions applied by the government as police power, uncompensated regulatory 
taking or eminent domain. The studies take the legal interpretation given and propose changes in 
the legal practice. That’s how the theory has become captive of the legislators and the judiciary: 
in practice, eminent domain must be defined as any seizure of property right when the 
government pays compensation.  
This thesis cannot use the American terminology. The Hungarian legislation and rulings 
use a different conceptual and language framework with definitions often as vague as legal 
definitions can be. Thus, this thesis to remain self consistent has to give a meaning for each 
category it is going to use.  
Taking is used in two senses: it is referring generally to the restrictions applied by the 
government on the property rights, and it is used as a synonym to substitute any specific form of 
those restrictions.  
Eminent domain is also used generally, but only to identify the discussed framework, the 
topic of this thesis. The same expression is referring to the restrictions considered as eminent 
domain by any of the two examined legal system. This is a specific legal authorization for 
restricting private properties. Very simplified, takings (restrictions) can be over eminent domain 
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(where the government has no authorization to restrict the property rights), or under eminent 
domain (where the government can restrict the property rights without using the eminent domain 
power). 
Expropriation is used only referring to the Hungarian legislation on the special legal 
process of taking real estate property. The Constitutional Court uses the same expression to refer 
to restrictions so serious that the Hungarian constitution’s eminent domain clause should be 
applied to them. Therefore, for explaining and analyzing the Hungarian system, eminent domain 
will be used instead of expropriation. 
Police power concept is referring to petty physical takings or regulatory actions where 
transaction costs prohibit efficient allocation by the market (except because of the holdout 
problem), but the government’s interference does not reach the level of transferring the 
ownership as a whole. In presenting the practices, the same expression is used for regulatory 
actions that are not recognized as regulatory takings.  
Regulatory action expression is referring to all restrictions on the property rights by 
regulations. These actions are regulatory in the sense that they are applied generally and not only 
to one or more previously identified pieces of land. Regulatory takings are regulatory actions 
where the eminent domain clause is or should be applied. 
Holdout problem is the key element of the economic theory of eminent domain. It occurs 
when landowners can frustrate large projects by insisting on getting a too large share of the trade 
surplus, because their land necessary for the project.  
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METHODS OF THE ANALYSIS 
This thesis conducts an analytical research on the Hungarian regulation on eminent 
domain. Due to the very limited publicity of the cases, the analysis must be rather theoretical, but 
the conclusions will be of practical use. The research is purely based on qualitative method, 
fundamentally on literature search, and the analysis of the Constitutional Court’s cases and the 
legislative texts, and on comparing the theoretical findings and actual regulations. 
Since 2008, court decisions on eminent domain must be made public on the homepage of 
the Hungarian Supreme Court. By April, 2010 a total of thirty-two cases have been disclosed. 
Cases, in which the landowner did not seek for judicial review are not made public at all. The 
limited numerical data does not allow a quantitative analysis. In none of the public cases did the 
court examine the legal conditions of the taking themselves. The remedy the plaintiffs sought 
was a raise in the compensation. The qualitative analysis of these court decisions is of little use. 
Unfortunately, the fact that the cases are anonymized makes it impossible to interview the 
landowners and collect direct data on their motives. 
The review of the law and economics literature on eminent domain is the basis of this 
thesis’s analytical parts. The theories were developed in an environment different from the 
Hungarian and the Hungarian literature has barely stepped over the boundaries of a strictly legal 
analysis. This paper does not make a comparative legal analysis, or an exhaustive description of 
the Hungarian eminent domain law. Without well developed descriptive theories, this thesis will 
not answer the question whether the Hungarian rules on takings fit any eminent domain 
definition or not either. Instead, with a broad scope, this paper is trying to use the findings of the 
foreign literature as a tool to analyze all the important economic aspects of the Hungarian 
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regulation on eminent domain, from the interpretation of the eminent domain clause of the 
Constitution to the Expropriation Act.  
The description, the analysis and the evaluation is built on the concept of law and 
economics, the principles of microeconomic theory. Therefore this thesis does not identify the 
pros and cons of the regulatory framework, other than the economic efficiency and inefficiency 
of the different rules.  
The most important constraint of this analysis is its focus on the current regulation. 
Instead of analyzing the effects of the regulatory framework based on the practice of the courts 
and the government agencies, conclusions must be drawn from the rules only. A second 
constraint is that the analysis focuses on the economically relevant parts of the legislation: the 
conditions of the takings and the compensation paid. 
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THEORIES AND PRACTICES 
THE CONCEPT OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
WHAT THE THEORY SUGGESTS? (BASED ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION) 
If any common element is to be found amongst the theories on eminent domain, it is 
clearly the government’s interference in the actual endowment of property rights. The reason, 
the subject, the method, the amount of compensation, everything else is different according to 
the particular theory, no matter whether they want to define or describe the concept. However, 
all of the concepts are dependent on the law in effect. Most of the theories in the economic 
literature are based on the takings clause of the United States Constitution: "...nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation" (Fifth Amendment). 
To identify the scope of the eminent domain concept, let’s examine what constitutes 
taking under the taking clause. The broadest interpretation by Epstein (1985) covers all 
nonmarket transactions enforced by the government: from taxation, through police power and 
regulatory takings, to the complete transfer of property rights on a certain land. In practice, the 
U.S. case law interprets the taking clause clearly in a much narrower sense: “direct government 
appropriation or physical invasion of private property” and – to a certain extent – regulatory 
actions [Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 554 U.S. 528 (2005)]. Physical acquisition covers the 
complete transfer of the ownership over the real estate, full or partial. 
In the case of the regulatory actions, the fact that the courts usually decide on the 
question of compensation makes the interpretation a little complicated. In Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., the Supreme Court found two cases that are takings per se: “(1) where government 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property, see Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, or (2) where regulations completely 
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deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property, Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U. S. 1003, 1019”. Regulatory actions not reaching the above mentioned 
level are often considered police power without compensation for public use, especially when the 
restriction does not go “too far” in taking private property [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 393 (1922)]. According to the Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978), the court would consider the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations and 
the character of the governmental action. 
It is important to examine the role of regulatory takings in the regulation structure. The 
regulatory taking concept differs from police power in a sense, that the police power is efficient 
without any compensation, even if the state takes only the budget spending into consideration as 
the costs of the taking [the fiscal illusion concept (Miceli & Segerson, 2007, p. 31)]. This is 
simply because the economic concept of police power is restricted for situations when the 
government acts efficiently in restricting negative externalities (Segerson, 2000, p. 337). It is 
clear that the distinction is tautological and artificial: it uses the efficiency criteria to avoid taking 
efficiency into consideration. At the same time, the distinction has a practical value: clearly 
efficient restrictions are easier and cheaper to enforce. Another case of clearly efficient 
regulatory restrictions is when the subjects of the restrictions are difficult to identify or are in a 
large number. In this case the transaction costs of either purchasing or compensating is higher 
than the public benefit from the taking minus the loss of the owner [While the value of a property 
taken is always significant, in the case of regulatory takings we see more variation. Nobody 
would look for immediate compensation if the government authorized the Transportation Safety 
Bureau to enter one’s property in case of air crash. (Act CLXXXIV. of 2005.)] The regulatory 
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taking concept differs from eminent domain power as well. Bypassing the market mechanisms 
by the eminent domain power is justified by the holdout problem. The regulatory taking concept 
is to fit between the above mentioned two categories: any regulatory action restricting property 
rights that is not justified by transaction costs or the holdout problem. 
THE HUNGARIAN CONCEPT 
Unlike the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution (drafted in 1787), the Hungarian 
Constitution’s takings clause was drafted (in 1989) when the theory of eminent domain was 
already well developed. Thus the Hungarian Constitution uses a legal term to refer to the power 
of eminent domain: “Expropriation shall only be permitted in exceptional cases, when such 
action is in the public interest, and only in such cases and in the manner stipulated by law, with 
provision of full, unconditional and immediate compensation”(Paragraph 2, Article 13). 
The differences between the common law and the continental legal system have some 
clear effect on the constitutional clauses. The American clause gives much more freedom for the 
courts for interpretation, while the Hungarian clause is less flexible. Some differences are clearly 
attributable to the history: the precondition of legislative decision and the immediateness of 
compensation are developed in the U.S. case law, but became enacted in the Hungarian 
constitution. The exceptionalness of the expropriation and the unconditional nature of the 
compensation are similar to the American concept of public use: they limit the power of eminent 
domain.  
On the efficiency criteria, the following differences are worth analyzing. First, the 
Hungarian legal system – by using a specific legal term – excludes the takings by restrictive 
regulations from the eminent domain scope. This is more or less the codification of the 
findings of the Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. case on regulatory takings. The Hungarian 
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Constitution applies a similar legal regime to regulatory actions, but with no constitutional 
obligation for compensation. Second, the justification of eminent domain is the public interest, 
instead of public use, and several other conditions limit the power of eminent domain. Third, 
the Hungarian constitution disposes full compensation, instead of just compensation. 
According to the U.S. case law, eminent domain “may only be exercised through 
legislation or through legislative delegation, usually to another governmental body” (Service, 
Congressional Research, 2002)]. In comparison, the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation restricts the national legislation’s power to regulatory takings, and – to provide a 
legal remedy at the regular courts – physical takings must be administered by the executive 
power under the detailed conditions defined by the legislation. 
ANALYSIS 
The line between the different forms of taking can be overly casuistic for both 
legislations; the following table tries to show the approach of the two legislations to the different 
possible restrictions of property rights.  
Type of taking United States regulation Hungarian regulation 
Taxation No regime No regime 
Nuisance regulation 
Police power Proportionality regime 
Regulatory taking  
Eminent domain regime Partial ownership taking Different partial taking 
regimes 
Complete ownership 
taking 
Eminent domain regime 
The pursuit of maximizing social efficiency is clearly identifiable: different procedural 
and compensational rules help minimizing social costs (including the owner’s loss and the 
procedural costs). The social surplus of taxation or nuisance regulation is well accepted, and 
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monetary compensation would not increase it. In both legal systems, the government can use 
police power with no compensation under a certain threshold. Over this threshold, the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Hungarian Constitutional Court compares the benefits and harms for the 
owner. The American test requires the regulation not to go “too far” [Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)], while the Hungarian test requires “proportionality” [64/1993. (XII. 
22.) ABH]. The erga omnes decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (that is generally 
applicable to the individual cases without further legal procedure) seems to be more efficient, 
because the litigation cost can be cheaper with only one procedure. While the U.S. system 
provides individual reparation in each case, the Hungarian system provides reparation according 
to the case, e.g. individual reparation if the harm is individual and general reparation if the harm 
is general. This difference is related to the disparities between the common law and continental 
legal system. 
In the followings, this thesis presents some important points, where the conceptual setting 
based on the Constitutional Court’s practice does not follow the theoretical findings. It will 
conclude that these discrepancies cause inefficiency in the power of eminent domain by 
changing the cost and benefit structure. The government uses the eminent domain power when it 
should not (because it is economically inefficient), and does not use the eminent domain power 
when it should (because it is economically efficient), moreover the government will use cheaper 
but less efficient forms of takings. 
First, there is no economic rationale behind having two completely different regimes for 
physical takings and takings by regulation. Rose-Ackerman argues, that “from an economic 
perspective the distinction between physical invasions and value-reducing regulations is not a 
meaningful one” (Segerson, 2000, p. 338). However, the Constitutional Court developed a 
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practice that clearly separates these two regimes. While physical takings deserve full 
compensation (eminent domain regime); takings by regulations may or may not be compensated, 
it is sufficient if they are proportional with the public goal. The two systems have different 
incentive structures: the government in a state of fiscal illusion will tend to substitute and use the 
power of takings even when the physical acquisition would be more efficient. In the fiscal 
illusion, the government will not take anything into consideration but the amount of 
compensation, and regulations that are not necessarily compensated have a smaller cost. But the 
total cost of a regulation can exceed the compensation cost. (Rose-Ackerman’s statement is valid 
if the two types of takings are based on the same conditions. However, distinguishing physical 
takings of lands with holdout problem and regulations with no holdout problem is meaningful. 
Unfortunately, in the Hungarian practice, this is not the case.)  
Second, there is no solid justification of having separate regimes for complete ownership 
transfers (such as taking a whole piece of land) and partial takings (such as establishing equitable 
servitudes). Legal costs might make it reasonable to have a simpler, more flexible regime for 
takings of smaller values. But partial takings and low value takings are different. The slight 
restriction of expensive real estate can easily be of greater value than the complete taking of a 
cheap apartment. To make it more complex, partial takings have different legal regimes based 
only on the type of the public goal (such as the protection of cultural or natural heritage) or 
investment (such as mining or different infrastructures). Some of those regimes are considered 
uncompensated regulatory actions; some are more similar to the eminent domain regime. This 
obviously distorts the relative prices of different real estates and investment types, and cheaper 
takings have an inefficient substitution effect. 
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Third, the question of which regime is to be applied is decided only on gradualness 
(Jakab, 2009). The lack of clear distinction in conditions aggravates the above-mentioned 
inefficiency problem. To avoid falling into the area of uncertainty and risking of applying the 
more costly eminent domain regime, the government will substitute the near-borderline takings 
by regulations with more but less serious restrictions. 
Finally, the proportionality test that the Constitutional Court uses to decide whether a 
regulatory taking or a law on taking is constitutional should be improved. On one hand, it shows 
some advantages of an efficiency test: the Constitutional Court can annul inefficient regulations 
on the basis of disproportionality. For example, in the decision 79/2006. (XII. 20.) ABH, the 
Constitutional Court held disproportionate the requirement to have the consent of all the 
neighboring apartments below, above and on the same level as the owners for keeping a dog. 
Moreover, the test is flexible; compensation is not the only accepted way to ensure the 
proportionality in a regulation for providing public goods. In this sense, the proportionality test – 
similarly to the fair market value compensation, in the case of eminent domain (Miceli & 
Segerson, 2007) – is a practical compromise between a strict economic efficiency test and the 
broad interpretation of police power in the U.S. On the other hand, the practice does not show 
any sign of the examination of transaction costs. It is easily possible, that a regulation is 
inefficient, because market transactions have smaller costs. One can argue that the Constitutional 
Court cannot review the government’s decisions based on efficiency test (because of its expertise, 
its mission or constitutional role). This thesis only wants to claim that by ignoring an important 
factor to disproportionality, the Constitutional Court misses a necessary and inseparable part of 
the efficiency test.   
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PUBLIC USE OR PUBLIC INTEREST 
THEORY REVIEW 
The common element of every interpretation of the public use requirement is that the 
taking has to result in some benefit or advantage to the public. The U.S. Supreme Court doesn’t 
constrain the condition any more than that, as seen in the recent cases. “The concept of the public 
welfare is broad and inclusive. …. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, 
aesthetic as well as monetary” [Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954)]. The public advantage can 
be indirect and distant, in Kelo City of New London 545 U.S. 469 (2005), the Supreme Court 
even allowed “to take property for the purpose of economic development”. This is the result of 
an evolution in the practice from a public use to a public purpose requirement (Toll, 2007).  
Theorists, on the contrary, derive a narrower meaning of the public use concept from the 
justification of the power of eminent domain: the holdout problem. Landowners can hold out for 
prices in excess of their true (subjective) valuation of the land, if the land is necessary for a 
project (Segerson, 2000, p. 330). The holdout problem’s primary efficiency cost appears in the 
decrease or cancellation of the investment due to the higher prices. This is a deadweight loss: the 
harm to the investor is not offset by any benefit to the landowner, the society as a whole suffers. 
The holdout problem’s importance related to the concept of eminent domain cannot be 
overemphasized. Even if the holdout problem was not the cause of the government’s eminent 
domain power [as Benson (2008) claims], it is clearly the economic reason behind it. If there is a 
reason at all. Richard Posner does not find any other possible cases when eminent domain is 
justified in the real world: “the only case in which it is conceivably warranted on economic 
grounds: where the need to assemble contiguous parcels creates a holdout problem” (Posner, 
1977, p. 44). 
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The holdout problem appears whenever a seller has monopoly power; theoretically it 
doesn’t matter whether the buyer is public or private. Therefore some theorists suggest that 
private interests should be given the power of eminent domain as well (Segerson, 2000, p. 330), 
when it increases efficient allocation. Justice Antonin Scalia argues in the Kelo v. City of New 
London case that the proposed ruling destroy "the distinction between private use and public 
use", definitely it would to rule that a more efficient allocation is always for the public interest, 
therefore for public use. Others oppose the taking for private interests based on two practical 
reasons: first, the risk of corruption and rent seeking, second, other methods exists which private 
parties can use to prevent holdout problem, such as purchasing with dummy buyers. Nonetheless, 
this debate cannot be decided on only economic principles. There will always be situations when 
the holdout problem cannot be avoided; the regulation has to address these cases based on an 
evaluation of the possible benefits and harms. 
THE HUNGARIAN APPROACH 
Originally, there was a noteworthy difference between the “public use” concept of the 
U.S. Constitution and the “public interest” in the Hungarian. The first one is related to the direct 
beneficiary of the taking, while the second one is related to the justification of the taking. 
Nevertheless, both conditions are designed to restrict the power of eminent domain to the 
socially efficient occasions. Before the two milestone decisions of the new practice [35/2005. 
(IX. 29.) ABH and the 47/2006. (X. 5.) ABH], the Constitutional Court examined public interest 
only if its missing was evident (Jakab, 2009). In the current interpretation, a taking that directly 
serves private interest, but indirectly solves social problems, is considered serving the interests of 
the public as well. Nevertheless, a general reference to the public interest does not justify the 
power of eminent domain. Although the constitutional concept of public interest is broad, the 
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Constitutional Court expects the legislative power to concretize the cases, when the government 
can use the eminent domain power to serve public interest. Generally speaking, the two concepts 
are moving towards a same meaning: the ruling in the Kelo v. City of New London case and the 
current practice of the Constitutional Court as well requires an existent, but indirect public 
benefit only.  
In 2005, the Constitutional Court examined the legislative framework of the eminent 
domain, and determined that there was an unconstitutional omission to legislate. The new Act on 
Expropriation Act (Act CXXIII. of 2007, entered into force in 1st January, 2008, applicable only 
to the complete physical takings of real estate properties) gives an exhaustive list of around forty 
investment situations, when the condition of public interest can be justified, such as the building 
of a nuclear reactor, a bridge or a tunnel, or stocking for a sustainable silviculture. 
The Hungarian takings clause requires exceptionality to use the power of eminent domain. 
This condition means that no taking can occur if the public goal can be realized in any other, less 
restrictive way. The Expropriation Act has three alternatives to the taking: restrictive regulation 
without the transaction of property rights, purchase of the property, and the use of another area of 
real estate. The last condition of eminent domain is a comparison between the advantages and 
disadvantages of the taking, the public benefits have to considerably exceed the “damages caused 
by the expropriation”2. 
In the following analyses this thesis presents the various conditions to takings. These 
conditions are responsible to restrict the power of eminent domain to the economically efficient 
cases. The positive conditions are to be met before any taking to be constitutional. They should 
                                                             
2 Expropriation Act, 3. § (1) d) 
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not be so restrictive to forbid economically efficient takings. The negative conditions (that must 
not be met for a taking to be constitutional) are responsible of forbidding takings that would not 
be economically efficient. 
ANALYSIS 1 – POSITIVE CONDITIONS  
Two causes make it impossible to evaluate the efficiency of taking conditions with purely 
economical methods. First, the socio-cultural environment is of high importance. In some cases, 
restricting the power of eminent domain to public investments can help preventing harmful 
bypasses of the market due to corruption. In other cases, it may have a market distorting effect 
favoring public companies against the privates. Second, different compensation rules are more or 
less efficient under different conditions. In an ideal world of perfect information, with a 
government that maximizes social efficiency, takings can be justified whenever the advantages 
(increased efficiency by making transactions happen through bypassing the holdout problem) 
outweigh the disadvantages (the efficiency loss due to the risk of a high subjective value of the 
original owner and wrong incentives for investment). Theories can give perfect solutions to 
avoid the disadvantages3, but – naturally – in practice there are just too many other factors to 
take into consideration. However, in the real world, the public use or public interest concept 
helps to restrict the eminent domain power to those cases when it really increases social 
efficiency. 
It would be obvious to provide the power of eminent domain only for cases with holdout 
problem, as this is the most important factor behind high transaction costs. Without holdout 
                                                             
3 It  is  even  possible  to  design  an  incentive  structure  that  is  efficient  without  the  holdout 
problem as well: if we know the probability of taking, the level of efficient investment , and the 
owner has the right to buy back the property for the social surplus of the taking, there is no risk 
of having too high a subjective value. 
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problem, it is very unlikely to have prohibitive transaction costs (too high to make market 
transactions); therefore using the power of eminent domain is probably less efficient than letting 
the market forces prevail. This leads to a much higher probability of unlawful influence as well. 
Neither the Hungarian regulation, nor the practice of the Constitutional Court gives any explicit 
reference to the holdout problem or prohibitive transaction costs. While the Hungarian public 
interest concept has some relationship with the holdout problem, approximations like this are 
inefficient.  
In the followings, this thesis analyzes different sides of the Hungarian regulation to find 
out if there is enough safeguard to restrict the power of eminent domain to the efficient cases and 
if it is possible to substitute the problem of houldout with other conditions. It will conclude that 
the public interest concept fails to act as an appropriate safeguard, restricting eminent domain to 
specific investment types is not efficient, and without the holdout condition, eminent domain for 
private use is dangerous. 
The closest approximation to the holdout problem is in the interpretation of the public 
interest concept. According to the 42/2006. (X. 5.) ABH, the governmental agencies (or the 
courts, in case of litigation) have to confirm that the property to take has some special 
characteristics giving reason for the taking. It is not enough to demonstrate that the investment 
itself is for the public interest. Theoretically, such special characteristic could be an assembly of 
the land that leads to the holdout problem, but the decision does not specify. After meeting all 
the other conditions explicitly required by the Expropriation Act, a reference to the holdout 
problem seems to be a meaningful economic interpretation of such additional special 
characteristic. Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court’s decision gives nothing explicit to 
confirm this interpretation. Moreover, the decision was brought in a case on regulatory taking, 
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and it is not undoubted that the above mentioned requirement applies to full physical takings 
(Jakab, 2009). All in all, the public interest concept itself is far from being a substitute of an 
explicit test for the holdout problem. 
Based on the public interest requirement, the Expropriation Act gives an exhaustive list 
of different investment types when the power of eminent domain can be used. This may be 
another way in the Hungarian legislation to restrict the eminent domain power to the efficient 
cases. The elements of the list are either typical investment situations when the assembly of land 
is frequent (infrastructure and mining), or other extreme cases of possibly prohibitive transaction 
costs (when the government needs a land with strategic location for national defense, a holdout 
problem can occur without land assembly). However, and naturally, not every investment out of 
these types necessarily generates a holdout problem, and some planned investments with holdout 
problems will not fit in these types. Besides the inherent negative effects of not having a holdout 
condition, the restriction of eminent domain to certain investment types has some other negative 
consequences as well. First of all, it makes the investments on the list relatively cheaper than 
other investments; influencing the prices has a negative impact on efficiency. Second, some 
cases of existing holdout problems, while not on the list, still don’t have an efficient solution. 
The Hungarian legislation does not copy the original concept of the U.S. Constitution in 
restricting the power of eminent domain to the public use. The public interest concept serves a 
different purpose. The Expropriation Act is in alignment with the purely economic theories in the 
sense that the takings can be initiated both by public and private parties. However, this regulation 
is reasonable only under an efficient regulation, with the condition of the holdout problem. 
Without it, the chance to acquire property at market price induces private parties to initiate 
takings purely for wealth transfer reasons. (For example, assume that Dexter has real estate, with 
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a fair market value of $30,000, but he values it at $50,000. Sinister can pursue mining activity on 
Dexter’s land, increasing its value to $40,000. In this case, Sinister will try to acquire the land he 
cannot buy for the market price by applying for eminent domain. Without knowing Dexter’s 
subjective value, it is easy to think that the eminent domain will increase efficiency.) It would be 
possible to limit the eminent domain power for the provision of public goods, as it would 
significantly decrease the risk of wealth transfer driven takings. But under the current regulations, 
the theoretically efficient solution to offer the eminent domain power for private parties, to 
provide private goods (mining, for example) is practically inefficient. 
ANALYSIS 2 – NEGATIVE CONDITIONS 
The constitutional condition of exceptionality serves the same purpose as all the other 
conditions discussed before. The exceptionality is the basis of the proportionality test, and – in 
the interpretation of the Constitutional Court – the most stringent requirement of takings (Jakab, 
2009). As the interpretative 479/B/1993. ABH phrases: the deprivation of the property right 
should occur only if all the other conditions are met and “it is absolute necessary for realizing the 
public goal, and the public goal cannot be realized any other way but by violating the property 
rights”. This conceptualization does not refer to any economic terms, but from economic 
perspectives, it would be reasonable to see it as a reference to the holdout problem. (Even though 
it directly contradicts the cost principle of economics with the wordings “absolute” and “cannot 
be accomplished any other way”.) This conjecture is supported by the 35/2005. (IX. 29.) ABH 
and 7/2006. (II. 22.) ABH; these decisions claim that the state has to acquire the necessary 
property by transactions based on the civil law and the legislation “have to restrict the power of 
eminent domain to the cases when the public goal can only be accomplished finally by the 
deprivation of the ownership”. This is as far as the Constitutional Court gets: an ambiguous 
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reference that really has a meaning in economic literature, but does not give any clear guidance 
for the legislation.  
The exceptionality requirement is reflected in the Expropriation Act in four conditions of 
any taking. These conditions will be discussed in the followings to analyze the positive and 
negative effects of every condition on the efficiency. 
1. The first precondition based on the exceptionality requirement is that the public goal 
must not be attained by any other restriction of the property rights on the given real estate (lesser 
than the physical taking). The conclusion is that this rule leads to an inefficient effect of the 
division of lands. 
This precondition seems to be a good way to minimize the impact of bypassing market 
mechanisms. However, in many cases partial takings are uncompensated (for example: 
restrictions for environmental protection not causing a considerable change in the production 
structure of the given property are not compensated4 ), thus the owners are not indifferent 
between the two options. As long as the difference between the owner’s subjective value and the 
compensation for a complete physical taking is smaller than the loss due to an uncompensated 
partial taking, the owner (and the society) would be better off without this requirement. Under 
different compensation regimes, the exceptionality requirement is rather damaging than 
protecting the owners’ interests. 
While nonphysical takings are inefficiently favored by the law, partial physical takings 
are not. There is no obligation by the law to divide the real estate and to take only the necessary 
piece. This regulation could help in minimizing the owner’s losses, because the difference 
                                                             
4 Act LIII. of 1996. on the protection of nature, 72. § (4) 
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between the subjective value and the compensation is smaller if the taken piece of land is smaller. 
However, the division of land can have other negative consequences (such as the economy of 
scale), therefore the law should provide a right for the owner to ask for full taking. Interestingly, 
the Expropriation Act already provides this right in some strict conditions (the previous use of 
the land or selling it for a fair price becomes impossible).  
Without the obligation for minimal partial physical training, the regulation has an 
inefficient substitution effect. When the expected compensation is smaller than the subjective 
value, the owner is encouraged to keep smaller pieces of land. In an equilibrium condition (in a 
given regulatory framework) real estate sizes are optimal for their economic purposes. 
Implementing the Hungarian regulation, large lands will have relatively higher expected 
probability of being taken and owners will have higher possible loss of their subjective value. To 
increase the (expected) value of their lands, owners will have incentives to divide the lands to 
smaller portions. 
2. The second precondition to a taking is that it must be impossible to acquire the 
ownership of the given real estate by purchase. The conclusion is that the rule is efficient when 
the purchase is frustrated for reasons beyond a purchase offer, but it leads to inefficiently low 
offers when there are no extraordinary transaction costs (besides the holdout problem).  
In microeconomics, the impossibility concept [the condition in the Expropriation Act is 
even more stringent than the wordings of the 7/2006. (II. 22.) ABH, which refers to the 
incapability of the state to acquire the ownership] does not make much sense, but the law gives 
clarification. There are three possible reasons for this impossibility. First: the rejection of the 
owner, second: the owner is unknown or impossible to reach, third: the real estate is unique.  
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In the first case, it is impossible to acquire the ownership if the owner rejected or ignored 
the purchase offer. This is a natural reason for taking; however there is no rule for the amount of 
the offer. It is easy to realize that a cost minimizing buyer will offer and buy at a price that is 
equal with the expected compensation minus the procedural costs for the owner, plus the costs of 
the procrastination of the ownership transfer. This price may be higher or lower than 
compensation cost, but when it is lower, problems come. On this price, the owner agrees in the 
trade, but – as discussed later – undercompensation has a negative effect on efficiency (shortly: 
too much taking, too small investments). To avoid this situation, the law should require the buyer 
to offer at least fair market price.   
In the second case of the second precondition, the owner of the real estate is uncertain or 
unknown. In the third case, the location of the owner is unknown or other reasons make the 
communication of the offer very difficult or considerably delayed. These two cases are related to 
extraordinarily high transaction costs and may be efficient cases of eminent domain without 
holdout problem. This implies that there should be a separate regime for these situations. The 
current regulation seems to be efficient for them. 
3. The third precondition requires that the public goal couldn’t be realized on any other 
real estate, or realizing it would mean greater harm of the property rights. The conclusion is that 
the first part of this precondition is efficient, but the second part may extend the power of 
eminent domain inefficiently to cases without holdout problem. 
The first half of this precondition is a very important safeguard. When there is more than 
one piece of land appropriate for the investment, the holdout problem does not occur: the free 
market will make sure that any owner accepts the price higher than his own subjective value, and 
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this is the only efficient solution. However, if the owners can cooperate (especially, if the 
available lands are owned by the same owner), holdout problem can still occur, and the 
Hungarian legislation has no remedy for this situation. 
The second half of this precondition is an alternative to the first half. Without any legal 
guidance on how to calculate the harm of the property rights, at least two interpretations are 
possible. Either this rule is supposed to minimize the expected loss of the owner (subjective 
value minus compensation) or the total (objective or subjective) value taken out of the market 
mechanism. Theoretically, the first option would be more efficient, but the subjective values are 
unknown. The second interpretation sounds reasonable, but it has a negative side-effect: owners 
can (and will) avoid takings with overinvestment. For example, if an owner has a high subjective 
surplus, she will be willing to invest wastefully in order to increase the objective value of the real 
estate, and decrease the possibility of losing the surplus because of a taking. This risk of wasteful 
investment can be mitigated by increasing the amount of compensation. Unfortunately – as 
discussed later – increasing the compensation prevents the owner from internalizing the risk of 
taking, causes a risk of wasteful investment as well. In an efficient system of eminent domain 
regulation, these effects have to be compared.  
The most serious problem with these alternatives is that the mere existence of another 
piece of land economically suitable for the planned investment probably annuls the holdout 
problem. Contrary to this, the current set of regulation authorizes the government to use the 
power of eminent domain when there are two possible pieces of land: because taking one is 
always smaller harm of the property rights than taking the other. It may be reasonable to provide 
the power of eminent domain for similar situations. However, appropriate safeguards must be 
implemented to make sure that the holdout problem occured. 
 25 
4. The fourth precondition refers to the social surplus of the power of eminent domain: 
the public value of the investment has to be considerably larger than the harm of the taking. The 
conclusion is that this precondition is economically unjustified, because the measurement of the 
social surplus is unrelated to the rules of market transactions.  
Once again, this is a requirement that could be interpreted as a substitute of the 
unmentioned holdout problem. According to theory, only when the transaction costs are 
prohibitive is it possible that there is a social surplus, but there is no market transaction satisfying 
both sides. Unfortunately, the law explicitly denies this interpretation: the significance of the 
public goal has to be compared to the features of the real estate. This comparison has nothing to 
do with the holdout problem or with the subjective values of the owner. Therefore the effects are 
similar to some previous rules: for economically justified takings it is an unnecessary burden, for 
other takings it has a limited effect in filtering the really inefficient ones. 
To summarize it, the exceptionality concept of the Hungarian Constitution could have a 
very strong positive effect on the efficiency of eminent domain. The Constitutional Court’s idea 
is to restrict the power of eminent domain to cases when the government cannot acquire the 
property through market transactions. However, this can be attributed to two distinct conditions: 
high transaction costs, or high subjective value of the owner. The Constitutional Court is unclear 
in the decisions and the Expropriation Act arguably fails to recognize the economic rationale 
behind eminent domain. The condition system has various effects, most of them negative on 
efficiency. However, the high number of conditions can have a strong effect overall in 
administratively restricting the cases of eminent domain to those absolutely necessary. 
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ANALYSIS 3 – THE PRACTICE 
In the previous, several legal conditions of takings were listed to figure out, whether the 
holdout problem, an important economic condition of takings is appropriately taken into 
consideration before the decisions. This short chapter is based on the practice and not the general 
regulations. The first paragraph is based on the public decisions of the Hungarian courts5. The 
second paragraph is based on the decision of the Hungarian parliament in specific investments. 
The very little information available on the practice suggests that the practice is in conformity 
with the regulation: there is danger of inefficiency. 
1. Unfortunately, no decision of the regular courts mentions any reference to the holdout 
problem. However, this is not very surprising, knowing that no plaintiff has questioned the legal 
conditions of the taking themselves in the court procedure. The matter of the case was always the 
amount of compensation. This suggests that the owners are either satisfied with the taking or do 
not believe in efficient remedy. This concludes that the government pays higher compensations 
or uses the eminent domain power more than the efficient. 
2. The parliament of Hungary has adopted some acts on specific investments6. In these 
bills, the legislator weighed the public interest to the possible risks and losses of a taking. These 
acts declare that the power of eminent domain must be used if purchasing a certain set of lands 
(necessary for the investment) was unsuccessful. Moreover, they declare that the condition of 
public interest should not be individually examined during the taking processes. In these linear 
investments (the tracks or dikes cannot be built anywhere else), the holdout problem naturally 
                                                             
5 http://www.birosag.hu/engine.aspx?page=anonim 
6 Such as  the  LXVII. Act of 2004. on  the program of  the protection against  flood  in  the Tisza 
valley and  the CXXVIII. Act of 2003 on  the development of  the motorways of  the Republic of 
Hungary. 
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occurs, and authorizing the takings is reasonable, assuming that the net effect of the investment 
is positive to the economy. Unfortunately, there is no trace of any analysis to compare the 
possible harms of takings to the expected benefits when these decisions were made. Without 
such analyses, the government is subject of political or business influence, instead of economic 
efficiency. 
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COMPENSATION 
THEORY REVIEW 1 – WHY COMPENSATE? 
The compensation paid for the property taken is a key element of the eminent domain 
concept. In practice, it separates takings that fall under the eminent domain regime from takings 
that do not. The single idea behind paying compensation is that the U.S. Constitution’s taking 
clause requires ‘just compensation’. It is easy to find political, ethical and legal reasons to 
provide such compensation.  
In the followings, the economic justifications of paying compensation are summarized. 
1. One economic reason is the previously referred fiscal illusion concept. In this realistic 
model, the government considers only the budgetary cost of a taking, as opposed to its true 
opportunity cost (Miceli & Segerson, 2007, p. 31). The smaller cost leads to excessive takings 
[especially for real estates (Segerson, 2000, p. 349)] and inefficient substitution. (However Ian 
Ayres argues that in a representative political system, the lack of compensation have an effect of 
reducing takings as well, because the landowners might rouse political resistance against them 
(Ayres, 2009).) 
Without compensation, the benefits of a taking are usually dispersed in the society, but 
the harms occur at the owner only. Because of the decreasing marginal utility, the society as a 
whole is better off if the costs are dispersed as well. Moreover, considering the taking as a 
special tax, the deadweight loss is smaller when imposed on the budget than when imposed on a 
single commodity due to the substitution effect and the elasticity of demand. It is also worth 
mentioning that if the regulation authorizes private parties to initiate takings, the lack of 
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compensation strongly encourages them to use “the takings mechanism rather than engaging in a 
voluntary transaction at their own cost” (Guerin, 2002). 
2. If the government restricts the power of eminent domain to the economically efficient 
cases (no fiscal illusion), less than full compensation causes overinvestment (more improvement 
in the value of the land than it is socially efficient). The owner may overinvest to increase the 
value of the land in order to avoid the taking (Miceli & Segerson, 2007, p. 28). Moreover, due to 
the loss aversion of the individuals, one could argue that the compensation should be larger the 
full value. 
3. Contrary to the aforementioned, there is a serious argument for paying no (or not full) 
compensation. Full compensation makes the owner indifferent between keeping the ownership 
and being compensated. The improvement of a real estate when the taking is imminent can be 
privately profitable, while socially wasteful (Cooter & Ulen, 2008, p. 185): for example 
repainting a house to enjoy the new color for only a few weeks. In other words, while choosing 
an efficient level of investment, the owner does not internalize the risks of taking7.  
4. Finally, full compensation is never really “full”, because the subjective value of the 
owner is unknown; therefore no compensation rule uses the subjective value as a basis. 
THEORY REVIEW 2 – HOW TO COMPENSATE? 
Theories on an efficient compensation rule have been developed in a large number. These 
theories can create an incentive structure that does not result in wasteful improvement or 
underinvestment. However, the best applicable theory strongly depends on the conditions of the 
                                                             
7 Theoretically, no compensation makes the owner internalize the total risk of taking, however 
usually  the  owner  has  little  information  on  these  risks  to  determine  the  efficient  level  of 
investment. 
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taking and the model used to describe the government’s behavior. In the real world, without 
perfect information, selecting a perfectly efficient model is impossible, and selecting a mostly 
efficient one is very difficult. 
Some compensation models are simply inapplicable: for example, if there is a high risk of 
slightly under- or overestimating the efficient level of investment (or the risk of a taking), the 
model may amplify the negative consequences and it does not give the expected outcome. 
Another problem is that without knowing the subjective value of the property to the owner, the 
only thing known about the relationship between the known market value and the unknown 
subjective value is that the latter is higher. Based on these constraints, this thesis accepts 
Guerin’s assertion on the limited usefulness of an economic analysis: “In the absence of accurate 
assessments of social benefit and cost, and of government decisions based solely on such 
assessments, the balance of judgment from these rules (…) is unavoidably subjective. (…) 
Economics does not give us a hard and fast operational framework for takings compensation” 
(2008). 
Because of the above mentioned reasons this thesis is not going to choose between the 
developed models, nor will it recommend any specific model to the Hungarian legislation. There 
are models that are more efficient than the market value compensation in terms of solving the 
problem of fiscal illusion and moral hazard as well, but these models are based on unrealistic 
assumptions8. Hermalin’s model9 is more realistic in the sense that it doesn’t require information 
                                                             
8 In Miceli’s model,  the  compensation  equals with  the market  value  at  the  efficient  level  of 
investment (knowing the probability of taking). Miceli and Segerson give an improved version of 
the no compensation rule that  limits the government to the efficient takings: the government 
pays  market  value  compensation  when  the  investment  is  at  efficient  level,  but  no 
compensation  if  the  landowner  overinvested.  While  these  rules  lead  to  efficient  level  of 
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beyond the value of the land at the public use. Unfortunately, this model is practically unfeasible 
as it recommends negative compensation: the landowner pays the value of the land in public use 
to keep the ownership (Miceli & Segerson, 2007, p. 32). Theoretically this model means that the 
government takes all the land that has a public value and resells its majority to the owner, it 
represents an extreme end of the distribution of the social surplus. 
It is possible to develop another efficient model based on Hermalin’s. This model is very 
simple, and also does not require any information other than the market value of the land to be 
taken. Under this compensation rule, the government expends the market value of the real estate 
to anybody, except the owner: it can either randomly ‘compensate’ another taxpayer, distribute 
the value among the taxpayers or decrease the collected taxes by the given amount. The 
compensation is full for the government so it internalizes the costs of the taking, and zero for the 
owner to avoid the moral hazard problem. 
The odds are against finding a model that compensates exactly on the subjective value. 
Moreover, theoretically efficient compensation rules are far from either subjective or market 
value compensation. Based on economic and non-economic reasons, fair market value 
compensation is still the most reasonable compensation rule. Fischel and Shapiro in their 
constitutional choice model show that the partial compensation rule is optimal (and only in that 
sense, efficient) in a majoritarian government model (Miceli & Segerson, 2007, p. 37), while 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
investment  and  taking  as  well,  they  unrealistically  assume  that  the  probability  of  taking  is 
known by the owner. (Miceli & Segerson, 2007, pp. 31‐33) 
9 Hermalin gives  two models, but  in  the  first one  the compensation  is either higher  than  the 
subjective  value  (inefficiently  increasing  the  cost  of  the  public  investment)  or  lower 
(inefficiently transferring the property rights. 
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Miceli shows that is effectively irrelevant (!)10 (Miceli, 2008). Miceli and Segerson conclude that 
in the real world, market value compensation is a practical compromise (Miceli & Segerson, 
2007, p. 48). 
THE HUNGARIAN APPROACH 
The Hungarian Constitution – unlike the American – requires full compensation. The 
compensation must be unconditional and immediate as well. The meaning of the latter two 
provisions is obvious. As to the second, the government cannot impose any condition to the 
compensation, such as the limited budget or any attribution of the owner or the real estate (Jakab, 
2009). As to the third, the compensation amount has to change ownership at the same time as the 
property taken [58/1991. (XI. 8.) ABH].  
The legal interpretation of the full compensation requirement is straightforward: it equals 
the damages the owner has to suffer because of the taking. In the 904/B/2000. ABH, the 
Constitutional Court recognized the gains from the taking (the owner’s share of the social gains 
from the given investment) as a counterpart of the damage, an element of the compensation. In 
this case, the Constitutional Court referred to the value of a piece of real estate before and after a 
partial taking, and argued that the compensation should be equal with the difference, conceived 
as the owner’s damage. Without any guidance given by the Constitutional Court on how to 
calculate the value of a piece of real estate, the legislation came up with a concept similar to the 
fair market value concept. According to the Expropriation Act 9. § (3), the market value of the 
local comparable lands should serve as the basis in determining the value of the taken land. If 
                                                             
10 He assumes that “taxes are uniformly assessed on the market value of individual properties 
and that landowners authorize the number of parcels to be taken from behind a veil of 
ignorance regarding which particular parcels will be taken”. The intuition for his result is that 
“landowners recognize the equivalence of taxes and takings in budgetary terms”. 
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any reason prohibits the real market value to be determined, the value of the land has to be 
approximated based on a list of factors given by the law. Such factors are the situation of the real 
estate, the present or the possible public utilities, the geographical and economical capabilities of 
the real estate, the culture in case of an infield, the classification criteria of the land and the 
profitability of the real estate. Two other provisions related to the value of compensation are 
worth analyzing. The first one expands the compensation to some specific costs of the taking. 
The second one (implicitly) declines compensation for any profit loss, except those occurring 
because of moving the business to a new location. 
ANALYSIS 
This analysis concludes that it is practically impossible to find an optimal set of 
compensation rules, but it is clearly possible to improve the Hungarian regulation. 
In the previous analyses, economic efficiency was the only aspect taken into 
consideration. In that sense, the compensation provision of the Hungarian regulation is not 
efficient, because its market value based compensation may lead to inefficient takings when the 
owner’s subjective value is higher than the value of the property in the public use. Moreover, the 
regulation creates a moral hazard for the owners to invest more than the efficient level. It is 
important to note, that in theory, Hermalin’s referred model would solve both problems. 
However, the concept of uncompensated taking of real estate property forces us to leave 
the framework of simple compensation models, as models compensating above the subjective 
value inefficiently increase the price of the investment, while models compensating below the 
subjective value loses the benefits of risk and cost distribution.  
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Choosing the most efficient model in the Hungarian socio-cultural and economical 
environment would take a deep research (that should have been done before adopting the new 
regulation). Without such research and within the Constitution’s “full compensation” clause, it is 
safe to say that the market value compensation is a good compromise: it is not far from 
efficiency and has a very low wealth distribution effect. Another practical reason behind the 
market value compensation is its relative ease to determine. However, a unique real estate market 
value determination is impossible, and instead a fair market value must be estimated. The 
Hungarian regulation addresses this problem well: the estimation of the market value and the fair 
market value is based on objective standards and not on the owner’s preferences. 
The most serious risk of the Hungarian compensation rule is the risk of takings driven by 
wealth transfer. As it was previously shown, providing the power of eminent domain for cases 
without holdout problem and for the provision of private goods may be inefficient, and it is 
especially true if the compensation is below the subjective value. It is recommended to change at 
least one of these criteria. If the compensation rule is to be changed, to ensure a division of the 
surplus as well, Epstein recommends a compensation rule for private investments that pays 
substantially more than the fair market value (and refers to the New Hampshire Mill Act that 
“fixed the compensation payable to the owner of a flooded land at 50 percent above the market 
value of the land”) (1985, p. 174). That would be reasonable to adapt this rule in Hungary to 
mitigate the dangers of inefficient takings.  
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the power of eminent domain, the government can bypass market mechanisms to 
increase social wealth. This power is justified only under certain conditions; therefore the role 
and efficiency of the regulations is very important. This paper analyzed the effect of the 
Hungarian law on eminent domain and concluded that there is much to improve. 
Without a single rationale behind the structure of the taking system, the applicable 
condition or compensation rule is inconsistent. The government and the owners have incentives 
to divert resources from their most efficient use, because they have different expected values 
under the different regimes. The Constitutional Court should revise its practice on regulatory 
actions and pronounce that examining the transaction costs is a part of the constitutional 
conformity analysis, and that regulatory takings must be compensated on the same level as the 
power of eminent domain. 
Additionally, the legislation on physical takings needs to be reconsidered. The regulation 
can be greatly simplified by focusing only the real justification of eminent domain: excessive 
transaction costs. First, the amended regulation has to explicitly refer to the holdout problem as a 
condition of taking. Second, a well founded market value based offer must precede the initiation 
of the eminent domain procedure to minimize the legal costs. At the same time, the advantages 
of the current regulations should be kept: providing takings for private parties and giving a list of 
takings when the holdout problem is independent from land assembly.  
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